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Abstract: The potential impacts of payments for environmental services (PES) and protected areas (PAs)
on environmental outcomes and local livelihoods in developing countries are contentious and have been
widely debated. The available evidence is sparse, with few rigorous evaluations of the environmental and
social impacts of PAs and particularly of PES. We measured the impacts on forests and human well-being of
three different PES programs instituted within two PAs in northern Cambodia, using a panel of intervention
villages and matched controls. Both PES and PAs delivered additional environmental outcomes relative to the
counterfactual: reducing deforestation rates significantly relative to controls. PAs increased security of access
to land and forest resources for local households, benefiting forest resource users but restricting households’
ability to expand and diversify their agriculture. The impacts of PES on household well-being were related to
the magnitude of the payments provided. The two higher paying market-linked PES programs had significant
positive impacts, whereas a lower paying program that targeted biodiversity protection had no detectable
effect on livelihoods, despite its positive environmental outcomes. Households that signed up for the higher
paying PES programs, however, typically needed more capital assets; hence, they were less poor and more food
secure than other villagers. Therefore, whereas the impacts of PAs on household well-being were limited overall
and varied between livelihood strategies, the PES programs had significant positive impacts on livelihoods
for those that could afford to participate. Our results are consistent with theories that PES, when designed
appropriately, can be a powerful new tool for delivering conservation goals whilst benefiting local people.
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El Impacto de los Pagos por Servicios Ambientales y A´reas Protegidas sobre la Subsistencia Local y la Conservacio´n
del Bosque en el Norte de Camboya
Resumen: Los impactos potenciales de los pagos por servicios ambientales (PSA) y a´reas protegidas (APs)
sobre los resultados ambientales y las subsistencias locales en los paı´ses en desarrollo son pole´micos y se
han debatido ampliamente. La evidencia disponible es escasa; ha habido pocas evaluaciones rigurosas de los
impactos ambientales y sociales de las APs y particularmente los PSA. Medimos el impacto sobre los bosques
y el bienestar humano en tres diferentes programas de PSA que se llevan a cabo dentro de dos APs en el norte
de Camboya usando un panel de aldeas de intervencio´n y controles emparejados. Tanto los PSA como las APs
brindaron resultados ambientales adicionales en relacio´n a los contrafa´cticos, esto quiere decir que redujeron
las tasas de deforestacio´n significativamente en relacio´n a los controles. Las a´reas protegidas incrementaron
el acceso seguro a los recursos del suelo y el bosque para las viviendas locales, beneficiando a los usuarios
de los recursos del bosque pero restringiendo la habilidad de las viviendas para expandirse y diversificar su
agricultura. Los impactos de los pagos por servicios ambientales sobre el bienestar de las viviendas estuvieron
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relacionados con la magnitud de los pagos proporcionados. Los dos programas de PSA de mayor paga y con
conexio´n al mercado tuvieron impactos positivos significativos, mientras que un programa de menor paga
con el objetivo de proteger a la biodiversidad no tuvo un efecto detectable sobre las viviendas, a pesar de
sus resultados ambientales positivos. Las viviendas que se inscribieron a los programas de PSA con mayor
paga, sin embargo, necesitaban t´ıpicamente ma´s bienes capitales, por lo que eran menos pobres y tenı´an
mayor seguridad alimentaria que otros aldeanos. Por esto, mientras los impactos de las APs sobre el bienestar
de las viviendas fueron limitados en general y variaron dependiendo de las estrategias de subsistencia, los
programas de PSA tuvieron impactos positivos significativos sobre las viviendas para aquellos que podı´an
costear participar. Nuestros resultados son congruentes con las teor´ıas de que los PSA, cuando se designan
apropiadamente, pueden ser una herramienta poderosa y novedosa para obtener objetivos de conservacio´n
mientras se beneficia a la gente local.
Palabras Clave: bienestar, conservacio´n de la biodiversidad, efectividad, evaluacio´n de impacto, pobreza
Introduction
A critical question for conservation policy is whether
interventions incur net costs or provide net benefits to
the local peoplewho are themost directly affected. There
is nowwidespread acceptance that conservation policies
should, at the very least, do no harm, and where possi-
ble should contribute to poverty alleviation (CBD 2008).
Protected areas (PAs) are one of the most widely adopted
policies, currently covering >12% of the terrestrial land
surface (UNEP-WCMC 2012). The debate around the im-
pacts of PAs has, however, been particularly contentious.
Large numbers of case studies document costs PAs have
imposed on local people, such as restrictions on agricul-
ture or access to natural resources (e.g., Brockington &
Igoe 2006; Coad et al. 2008; Roe 2008). The concern
about such negative impacts is a key reason why newer
policies, such as payments for environmental services
(PES), which provide benefits to local people condi-
tional upon achieving an environmental outcome or a
change in behavior, have gained popularity (Ferraro &
Kiss 2002; Wunder 2007). It is hypothesized that PES
improves local well-being due to the benefits provided
(Ferraro & Kiss 2002; Pagiola et al. 2005). This hypoth-
esis has, however, not been tested with empirical data
(Pattanayak et al. 2010).
Rigorous impact evaluation methods are widely cred-
ited with having transformed development policy by
quantifying the contribution that specific interventions
have made to improvements in human well-being
(Banerjee & Duflo 2011). There have been calls for adop-
tion of the same methods in environmental science (Fer-
raro & Pattanayak 2006). Most published studies to date
have focused on assessing environmental rather than
social outcomes, for example, using impact evaluation
methods to show that PAs and PES policies do indeed
protect forests (Andam et al. 2008; Joppa & Pfaff 2011;
Arriagada et al. 2012). These studies have also shown
the critical importance of making comparisons with ap-
propriate controls to avoid overestimating the effective-
ness of interventions (Andam et al. 2008). Only 3 studies
have evaluated the social impacts of PAs in developing
countries, and in these cases PAs had no net impact or
slightly positive impacts for local people (Andam et al.
2010; Sims 2010; Naughton-Treves et al. 2011). Our study
is one of the first impact evaluations of the effects of PES
on well-being in a developing country.
Published social impact evaluations also focus on net
impacts determined via single povertymeasures,whereas
human well-being is complex and multifaceted (Scoones
1998; Agrawal & Redford 2006; McGregor 2007). Inter-
ventions with minimal effects on income may nonethe-
less contribute to less tangible aspects of well-being such
as access to resources and education. There is also a
need to disaggregate outcomes in order to understand
the impacts of conservation interventions on different
subsets of society (Daw et al. 2011), especially vulnerable
groups. Impacts must also be understood in the context
of a dynamic system, particularly as rural populations
become increasingly linked to markets.
We used impact evaluationmethods to quantify the im-
pact of PAs and PES over time on a panel of intervention
and matched control households practicing a range of
livelihood strategies in villages in the northern forests of
Cambodia. Northern Cambodia was an ideal location to
test the impacts of PAs and PES because the interventions
we studied were initiated relatively recently, thereby al-
lowing before–after comparisons to be made, the PAs
had existing residents, and the PES schemes have been
well-documented (Clements et al. 2010). We considered
whether PAs and PES delivered additional environmental
outcomes relative to the counterfactual; the impact of
PAs onmultiple aspects of local well-being; the additional
impact of PES programs on local well-being relative to
the counterfactual; and the differential impacts of these
interventions on different livelihood strategies.
Methods
Study Site
Our study site was the core management zones of 2 PAs
in northern Cambodia (Supporting Information): Kulen
Promtep Wildlife Sanctuary (gazetted 1993) and Preah
Vihear Protected Forest (gazetted 2002). The PAs are in
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remote forest areas and contain 16 long-established vil-
lages. Local people were primarily subsistence farmers,
practicing either rain-fed paddy rice or shifting cultiva-
tion and were dependent on forest resources both as
a safety net and for cash income, particularly from the
sale of liquid resins from dipterocarp trees (McKenney
et al. 2004). Under Cambodian law, local uses of natural
resources within PAs are legal, although forest clearance,
commercial logging, and hunting or trade in threatened
species are illegal. Both PAs were paper parks until active
management started in 2005. Villages were permitted by
PA authorities to expand agriculture to a limited extent
within agreed land-use plans. Three PES programs were
instituted in villages within the PAs to complement PA
management: direct payments for protection of nests
of globally threatened birds in 6 villages; community-
managed ecotourism conditional upon wildlife and habi-
tat protection in 2 villages; and payment of premium
prices for agricultural goods to households that kept to
the land-use plans in 4 villages, which included those
with ecotourism and the Bird Nests protection program
(Ibis Rice) (Clements et al. 2010).
Survey Design
Impact evaluation methods (quasi-experimental match-
ing and difference-in-difference) were used to control
for observable and unobservable sources of bias in order
to provide confidence that observed differences were
due to the PA and PES interventions rather than other
factors. Quasi-experimental matching was used to con-
trol for possible observable sources of bias by selecting
control groups thatwere as similar as possible to the treat-
ment groups prior to the initiation of the interventions.
Matching assumes that there were no sources of unob-
served bias. Difference-in-difference estimators control
for time-invariant unobservable characteristics through
the use of data from the same treatment units over
time (Wooldridge 2002). A key assumption is that the
expected trend in the outcome variable for the control
group is equal to the expected trend for the intervention
group, in the absence of the intervention. Combining the
methods, by using matching to select the control groups,
can help reduce this source of bias; this is called a BACI
study (before–after, control intervention).
Environmental outcomes were measured using defor-
estation rates in 1-km grid squares because the PAs and
2 of the PES schemes explicitly targeted forest protec-
tion. Social outcomes were based on assessed household
well-being. For the assessment of PA impacts, we used 3
comparison groups: villages within PAs; control villages
>20 km from the PA boundaries that were matched
to the within-PA group based on observed variables in
2005, prior to initiation of the interventions; and villages
bordering the PAs (4–12 km from the PA boundary) be-
cause studies usually assess PA impacts in comparison
with nearby areas (Joppa & Pfaff 2010). Environmental
outcomes were assessed using a full BACI study compar-
ing the deforestation rates around within-PA villages be-
fore and after PA management started with the matched
control group. Social outcomes of PAs could not be as-
sessed using a full BACI study because data on household
well-being was not available prior to the start of PA man-
agement. Instead, outcomeswere assessed in comparison
with the matched control villages only, following the
same panel of households over time.
Environmental impacts of PES were assessed using a
full BACI study that compared the deforestation rate in
grid squares around villages receiving forest protection
payments (ecotourism and Ibis Rice) with matched con-
trol squares around other villages within the PAs that did
not receive payments, both before and after payments
were initiated. Social impacts of PES were assessed using
difference-in-difference estimators that compared house-
holds that received payments with those in the same
villages that did not, before and after the initiation of
payments.
Selection of Matched Control Villages for within-PA Villages
For the PA impact assessment, potentialmatches to the 16
within-PA villages were chosen from a database of all 211
villages in Preah Vihear province. The matching variables
selected were forest cover within 5 km of the village,
village size, and distances to roads and markets,
all in 2005. These variables were the main fac-
tors thought to have influenced PA placement and
were the main determinants of poverty at the
village level prior to the initiation of the PAs
(Supporting Information). We carried out nearest-
neighbor covariate matching using the Mahalanobis
distance (Abadie & Imbens 2006) in R version 2.14.2
to ensure that the sample of intervention and control
villages were not significantly different (Supporting In-
formation). We then used random stratified sampling by
district to select 7 control villages that were >20 km
from the PAs and distributed across the landscape. Match-
ing ensured that the control villages were as similar as
possible to the within-PA villages for observed baseline
characteristics in 2005 (prior to the initiation of the in-
terventions) that would be expected to have significant
effects on local livelihoods and deforestation rates.
Environmental Outcome Measure
Deforestation rates were calculated between the 2001 to
2002 dry season (hereafter 2001/2002) to the 2005 to
2006 dry season (hereafter 2005/6), the 4 years immedi-
ately prior to establishment of the PAs, and from 2005/6
to the 2009 to 2010 dry season (hereafter 2009/10), when
the PAs were actively managed and PES schemes were
operational. We used all 16 villages within the PAs (4 of
which had received Ibis Rice and ecotourism payments),
the 7 controls, and all 11 villages that bordered the PAs.
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Forest and non-forest areas were mapped for all 1-km grid
squares within 8 km of the villages at a resolution of 1
ha (Supporting Information). We chose the 8 km radius
because thiswas themaximumdistance local people trav-
eled to agricultural plots. For the analysis of PA impacts,
grid squares were assigned a treatment type depending
on whether they were within a PA (n = 1356), around a
control village (n = 913), or bordering a PA (n = 1035).
For the analysis of PES impacts within the PAs, squares
were assigned a treatment type depending uponwhether
they were within 5 km of one of the 4 PES villages
(n = 217) or were within 5 km of another village in the
PA that was not receiving payments (n = 433). We used
the reduced radius of 5 km to separate effects due to the
different villages because theminimumdistance between
villages was 10 km. A second level of matching was used
to compare the effects of the treatments on similar 1-km
grid squares. The base forest area in 2001/2002 (for the
first 4-year period) or 2005/2006 (for the second 4-year
period), the distance to nearest village, and slope were
used as the matching variables because these variables
are known to affect deforestation rates. The variance
of the matching estimator was adjusted to account for
the clustering of grid squares around villages (Hanson &
Sunderam 2012). Covariate balancing tests confirmed
that the 2 selected samples were closely matched (Sup-
porting Information).
Social Outcome Measures
We used 4 measures of household well-being: poverty,
determined with the Basic Necessities Survey (Davies
2006; Supporting Information); rice harvests, because
rice is the staple crop in Cambodian diets; food security;
and education level of each household member. House-
holds were categorized by which livelihood strategies
they practiced (e.g., resin tappers, shifting cultivators).
Livelihood data were collected in 2008, 3 years after PA
management was initiated and before households were
paid from any of the PES programs, and in 2011, after
households had been receiving payments for 1–3 years
(depending on the program and the household). Surveys
were conducted by trained Cambodian social researchers
in 20 villages: 11 within the PAs, 5 matched controls, and
4 villages bordering the PAs (Supporting Information).
The first assessment of 871 households was conducted
in September–November 2008, 3 years after the PA man-
agement activities were initiated and before the market-
linked PES programs were scaled up. Households were
selected through random stratified sampling based on a
participatory wealth ranking exercise in each village. The
second assessment took place in July–September 2011
for the same households and an expanded sample (1053
total). Twelve percent of the original sample could not
be located, either because people had moved away or
were absent. We interviewed 769 households in both
periods (443 within PAs, 185 controls, and 141 in border
villages). In the PA impact evaluation, we used the entire
panel of 769 households. In the PES impact evaluations,
we used a subset of villages from within the PAs: 174
households from 4 villages for ecotourism and Ibis Rice,
of which 27 and 50 households respectively were paid
during 2008–2011; and 247 households from 6 villages
for the bird nest protection payments, of which 28 were
paid during 2008 to 2011.
Mixed effects models in R version 2.14.2 were used to
analyze the factors influencing the well-being variables
(poverty, rice harvests, and food security); village was
included as a random effect (Pinheiro et al. 2011). Models
were formulated for each variable in 2008 and 2011 and
for the change in each variable between 2008 and 2011.
Competing models were developed based on the main
research questions and compared using second-order
Akaike information criterion corrected (AICc) values
calculated using maximum likelihood, removing terms
with AICc values of >4 (Burnham & Anderson 2002;
Supporting Information). Final model coefficients were
then estimated using restricted maximum likelihood
(Burnham & Anderson 2002). Contrasts tests were used
to compare households within PAs with households in
control villages and with households on the border of
PAs. Binomial categorical variables (e.g., if a household
had a resin tapper) were analyzed using mixed effects
models with a binomial error distribution. Models were
used to compare the differences between interventions
and years in terms of the livelihood strategies practiced
by households and to determine which variables were
characteristics of households that chose to sign up for
PES programs. Education was expressed as whether a
child was attending high school or not.
Results
Additional Impacts of PAs and PES on Environmental
Outcomes
Deforestation rates within the PAs significantly decreased
after PA management started in 2005/6 (P < 0.05),
whereas deforestation rates increased significantly both
in control areas and in the border areas around the PAs
during the same period (Table 1). Based upon the match-
ing estimators, deforestation rates within the PAs were
significantly less than in control areas after PA estab-
lishment, whereas there was no significant difference
before PA establishment (Supporting Information). PAs
reduced the deforestation rate by >60% in comparison
with the control areas. The deforestation rate in border
areas to the PAs was much greater than inside the PAs
and increased significantly after the PAs were established
(Table 1). Border-PA villages were closer to markets and
roads (Clements et al. 2014), which might be expected
to increase deforestation rates, and there may also have
been spillover effects from the PAs. Comparing border
areas with PAs is therefore not an appropriate way to
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Table 1. Changes in deforestation rates between the 4 years prior to establishment of the protected areas (PAs; 2001/2002 dry season to 2005/2006
dry season) and the subsequent 4 years after establishment (2005/2006 dry season to 2009/2010 dry season) for protected areas, matched control
areas, and areas bordering the PAs, and for villages receiving payments (PES), and villages not receiving payments within the PAs.
Landscape-level interventions Within PAs only
PAs Controls Border areas PES No PES
No. of 1-km grid squares (no. of villages) 1356 (16) 913 (7) 1035 (11) 217 (4) 433 (11)
Deforestation rate between 2001/2002 and −0.872 (0.105) −1.398 (0.173) −2.193 (0.167) −2.529 (0.477) −0.534 (0.086)
2005/2006 before PA establishment (SE)a
Deforestation rate between 2005/2006 and −0.636 (0.058) −2.001 (0.214) −3.595 (0.194) −0.734 (0.096) −1.298 (0.151)
2009/2010 after PA establishment (SE)a
Difference between periodsb 0.236∗ −0.603∗ −1.402∗∗∗ 1.795∗∗∗ −0.765∗∗∗
Matching estimator clustered by villageb ,c −1.152∗ −2.352∗∗∗ −0.712∗
Effect size 3.947 3.801 2.144
aData are based upon the average deforestation rate (in hectares) of 1-km grid squares in the areas surrounding the villages.
bSignificance: ∗P< 0.05; ∗∗P < 0.01; ∗∗∗P < 0.001.
cThe matching estimator indicates the significance of the difference between the deforestation rate within PAs and controls or border areas and
between the deforestation rate around villages within PAs receiving payments and villages not receiving payments. Hence, it gives the estimated
effect of interventions from 2005/2006 (when implementation started) until 2009/2010.
assess PA impacts (Joppa & Pfaff 2010). The PES inter-
ventions reduced deforestation rates within the PAs by
an additional 50% over the 2005/2006 to 2009/2010 pe-
riod (Table 1). We have shown separately that the bird
nests PES interventionwas highly successful at protecting
globally threatened birds (Clements et al. 2013).
Changes in Livelihoods Over Time
National economic growth in Cambodia averaged nearly
10% from 1998 to 2008, declined to 0.1% in 2009 during
the global financial crisis, and recovered to 6–7% from
2010 to 2012 (World Bank 2012). In the context of this
rapid economic development, it is unsurprising that the
well-being of households in the panel increased signifi-
cantly between 2008 and 2011 (Table 2) and that this
increase was seen both for the poorest and richest quin-
tile in the sample (Supporting Information). On average,
household poverty decreased, agricultural productivity
and food security improved, land holdings increased,
and more households operated family businesses and
adopted mechanized agriculture. Households switched
from shifting cultivation—which requires lower inputs
but is less productive—to paddy rice and began growing
cash crops. Increased mechanization was funded by sales
of assets, particularly resin and livestock, and led to de-
clines in the number of cattle and the use of animals for
agriculture (Table 2 & Supporting Information). House-
holds that were poorer in 2008 were less likely to make
these switches and tended to be less educated, had fewer
working adults, younger household heads, and fewer as-
sets and were unlikely to operate family businesses or
have jobs (Supporting Information).
Additional Impacts of PAs on Well-Being
In both 2008 and 2011, households bordering PAs were
less poor, had larger rice harvests, and were more food
secure than households within PAs or controls (Table 2
& Supporting Information). Households bordering PAs
also increased their rice harvests at a greater rate than the
other treatment groups (Supporting Information). Border
households were better off because they were closer
to roads, markets, and services than both households
within-PAs and controls (Clements et al. 2014), demon-
strating that comparing within-PA groups with nearby
villages is not a valid way to assess PA impacts (Joppa &
Pfaff 2010).
PAs had limited impact on household poverty rel-
ative to matched controls. The within-PA group was
significantly better off than the control group in 2008
(Table 2 & Supporting Information), and there was no
significant difference between the 2 groups in both the
rate of change in household poverty status and house-
hold poverty status in 2011. For the other main well-
being variables, rice harvest and food security, there
were no significant differences in either the absolute
values or the rate of change (Supporting Information).
The percentage of residual variance explained by the
village term was low in all models, implying that un-
observed factors at the village level did not bias the
results (Supporting Information). The overall impact of
PAs on households was therefore quite limited, which
suggests that rates of change were mainly due to larger
economic factors at the landscape or national level, such
as Cambodia’s rate of economic growth during the study
period.
Differences in PA Impacts among Livelihood Strategies
There was considerable similarity in the prevalence of
some livelihood strategies between within-PA and con-
trol households in 2008; however, householdswithin PAs
were more reliant on nontimber forest products, partic-
ularly resin, than control households (Table 2). Control
households were more likely to practice shifting cultiva-
tion for rice, and this difference between the controls and
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Table 2. Household well-being and livelihood strategies for a panel of 769 households bordering protected areas (PAs), within PAs, and in matched
control areas outside PAs in northern Cambodia, 2008–2011.
Test of differencea
Border PA Within PA Control (within-PA vs. controls)
2008 2011 2008 2011 2008 2011 2008 Change 2011
Households 141 141 443 443 185 185
Well-being variables
Poverty 10.5 12.5 9.6 11.8 8.0 11.4 ∗b ns ns
Rice harvest (kg) 2181 3015 1851 2506 1293 2329 ns ns ns
Food security (kg) 219 1942 −230 1337 −633 1109 ns ns ns
Livelihood strategiesc
Resin tapper (%) 32 30 55 59 28 37 ∗∗∗ ns ∗∗∗
Rice farmer (%) 94 96 91 96 94 95 ns ns ns
>1 ha of paddy fields (%) 90 90 73 85 63 79 ∗ ns ns
Mini tractor (%) 36 54 30 60 26 37 ns ∗∗ ∗∗∗
Rice shifting cultivation (%) 38 27 37 26 45 39 ∗ ∗ ∗∗
Cash crops n/a 5 n/a 2 n/a 10 ∗∗
Employed (%) 11 10 6 9 3 4 ns ns ∗
Service or shop (%) 23 24 14 26 14 29 ns ns ns
aTests of difference are mixed effects regression models for continuous variables (poverty, rice harvest, food security, cattle) and generalized
mixed effects models with a binomial link function for categorical variables.
bTests of difference significance values: ns, not significant; ∗P < 0.05; ∗∗P < 0.01; ∗∗∗P < 0.001.
cHouseholds could have more than one livelihood strategy.
within-PA households significantly increased from 2008
to 2011. Control households were also far more likely
to be growing cash crops in 2011. The PA authorities
strictly restricted expansion of shifting cultivation and
cash crops, which probably explains these differences.
Employment rates increased within PAs during 2008–
2011, in comparison with controls, principally due to
hiring of local villagers by the PAs.
Although the average rates of change in poverty status
were similar among households within PAs and controls,
significant differences were observed for different liveli-
hood strategies. Within PAs, resin tappers improved their
economic status at a greater rate than those who did
not tap resin, whereas the reverse was observed for the
controls (Fig. 1a & Supporting Information & significance
P < 0.01). Poverty reduction rates for those who did not
tap resin were therefore significantly slower within PAs
than outside PAs, perhaps because control households
could practice other forms of agriculture (shifting cultiva-
tion and cash crops) thatwere restricted by the PA author-
ities. Tenure security over resin trees was greater within
PAs, potentially explaining why resin tappers within PAs,
who made up 59% of within-PA households in 2011
(Table 2), did significantly better.
Land tenure security was also higher within PAs,
whereas some control households lost access to land
for farming due to development pressures. Consequently
rice harvests of control households that did not own
>1 ha of paddy fields declined slightly, whereas similar
households within PAs showed continued improvements
in rice harvests (Fig. 1b & Supporting Information &
significance P < 0.05). Households that did not own
>1 ha made up a minority of households under each
treatment type: 21% of households outside PAs and 15%
of households within PAs (Table 2).
Participation in PES Programs
Entry into 2 of the 3 payment programs was not ran-
dom. Households that decided to sign up for the Ibis
Rice and ecotourism programs had greater rice harvests,
were more food secure, and were more likely to have
>1 ha of paddy fields than households that chose not
to participate in 2008 (Table 3). Ibis Rice households
were also less poor and more likely to use machinery.
In the case of Ibis Rice, this is understandable because
only net rice producers could afford to sell excess rice to
the program. The ecotourism program required house-
holds to divert labor from agriculture to invest in tourism
activities, which again suggested that households that
were more food secure were more likely to sign up. As
a consequence participants in the ecotourism program
were also more likely to participate in the Ibis Rice pro-
gram (Fisher’s exact test of independence, P = 0.06). For
the ecotourism program, some elite capture may have
occurred; participants in 2008 were more likely to be
employed, particularly in the public sector (teachers, vil-
lage chiefs, and commune councilors), although by 2011
they had mostly been replaced. The ecotourism program
also positively targeted poor female-headed households
through participation in a women’s group that sold sup-
plies to tourists; all Ibis Rice households were headed
by men. Households engaged in the Bird Nests program
were similar to other households in the village, proba-
bly because households received immediate payments to
cover the costs of nest protection (and then a bonus if
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Table 3. Differences between household status and livelihood strategies in 2008 before the commencement of the payments for environmental
services (PES) programs for households that participated in the PES programs and households that did not.a
Bird nest participantsb Ecotourism participantsc Ibis Rice participantsc
Yes No Pd Yes No Pd Yes No Pd
No. of households 28 219 27 147 50 124
Female-headed households (%) 7 5 11 5 0 8
Well-being variables
Poverty 9.4 9.4 ns 10.8 10.2 ns 11.1 9.9 ∗
Rice harvest (kg) 2154 1935 ns 2811 1926 ∗∗ 2707 1804 ∗∗∗
Food security (kg) −194 −154 ns 304 −191 (∗) 486 −357 ∗∗
Livelihood strategies
Resin tappers (%) 64 55 ns 56 56 ns 54 57 ns
Rice farmer (%) 89 90 ns 93 88 ns 96 85 (∗)
>1 ha of paddy fields (%) 68 72 ns 93 76 ∗ 94 72 ∗∗
Mini tractor (%) 29 26 ns 33 25 ns 44 19 ∗∗
Rice shifting cultivation (%) 43 31 ns 11 18 ns 10 19 ns
Employed (%) 0 9 ns 19 7 (∗) 14 6 ns
Service or shop (%) 14 12 ns 19 13 ns 14 14 ns
Average annual payments per household, 132 (18) 225 (14) 413 (41)
US$ (SE)
Percentage of households in the village 7 (616) 12 (499) 24 (616)
engaged in program (total households)
Percentage of households engaged 10 62 54
for > 1 year
aData are from the same villages within the protected areas.
bData for the Bird Nests program are based on 6 villages (247 households). The Bird Nests program provided direct payments for protection of
nests of globally threatened birds.
cData for the Ecotourism and Ibis Rice programs are based on 4 villages (174 households). The ecotourism program provided payments
conditional on wildlife and habitat protection, and Ibis Rice provided households with premium prices for agricultural goods if they kept to
agreed land-use plans.
dTests of difference are mixed effects models with a binomial link function. Significance: ns, not significant; ∗P < 0.1; ∗P < 0.05; ∗∗P < 0.01;
∗∗∗P< 0.001.
the nests were successful), so there were fewer barriers
to entry. Engagement in the Bird Nests programwas inde-
pendent of participation in the other 2 programs (Fisher’s
exact test, P = 1 and P = 1).
Additional Impacts of PES Programs on Well-Being
Households that signed up to the Ibis Rice and ecotourism
programs improved their poverty status at a greater rate
than non-PES households from the same villages, even
when we accounted for the fact that some started at a
higher baseline level in 2008 (Table 4; P < 0.05 in both
cases). Ibis Rice households also increased their rice har-
vests and improved their food security at a faster rate than
other comparable households (Table 4; P < 0.01 in both
cases). Households that received high payments from the
ecotourism and Ibis Rice programs were able to afford to
keep their children in school for longer and to pay for
them to attend secondary and high schools away from
their home villages (Table 4; P < 0.01). The Bird Nests
program had no additional impact on household well-
being, perhaps because the payments were significantly
lower than the other schemes (Table 4). The models
for the PA impact evaluation also showed that the Ibis
Rice and ecotourism programs improved household well-
being (Supporting Information).
Discussion
The importance of ecosystem services to overall human
well-being is well recognized (MEA 2005), but interven-
tions to manage and conserve ecosystem services may
impose costs (Brockington & Igoe 2006; Cernea &
Schmidt-Soltau 2006; Coad et al. 2008) as well as benefits
(Wunder 2001; Scherl et al. 2004; Coad et al. 2008) on
local people. We used rigorous impact evaluation meth-
ods to analyze both the social and environmental impacts
of interventions to conserve and maintain ecosystem ser-
vices, through PAs and PES.
We found that since their initiation, PAs and PES have
delivered additional conservation outcomes in northern
Cambodia, relative to the counterfactual, in terms of pro-
tection of tropical forests from deforestation and, for
at least one of the PES programs, protection of glob-
ally threatened wildlife species (Clements et al. 2013).
The principal effect of the PAs since the start of ac-
tive management was to mitigate external drivers of
ecosystem loss (especially deforestation), particularly in-
migration to existing villages, formation of new settle-
ments, and the gazettement of large-scale concessions
for agro-industrial development within PAs (which be-
gan after 2008). Implementation of the PES programs
would have been impossible without this protective
Conservation Biology
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Table 4. Effects of the payment for environmental service (PES) programs on the change in 4 measures of well-being between 2008 (before
payments) and 2011 (after payments).
Povertya,b Rice harvestb Food securityb Educationb,c
Intercept 5.627 ∗∗∗ 26.020 ∗∗∗ 60.507 ∗∗∗ −3.122 ns
Base variable −0.386 ∗∗∗ −0.503 ∗∗∗ −0.746 ∗∗∗
Ibis Rice program, payment 0.058 ∗∗∗ 0.381 ∗∗∗ 0.297 ∗∗∗ 0.110 ∗
Ecotourism program, payment 0.053 ∗ 0.003 ns −0.029 ns 0.074 (∗)
Bird Nests program, payment −0.022 ns −0.053 ns 0.078 ns −2.048 ns
Household head education level −0.739 ns
Change in poverty 0.311 ns
Random effect of households: Percentage residual variation 0.0
Random effect of village: Percentage residual variation 9.3 6.4 5.6 29.5
aMixed effects models (poverty, rice, food security) are based on a panel of 174 households from 4 villages where the PES schemes were in
operation. Fifty households were involved in the Ibis Rice scheme, 27 were involved in ecotourism, and 16 received direct payments for protection
of bird nests.
bSignificance: ns, not significant; ∗P < 0.1; ∗P < 0.05; ∗∗P < 0.01; ∗∗∗P < 0.001.
cEducation is represented by whether a child was attending a high school (in a district or provincial town). The education model had a binomial
link function based on a panel of 36 children who had completed primary school by 2008 (28 households out of the 174).
(a)
(b)
Figure 1. Effect of protected areas on (a) poverty
status of resin tappers, measured using the Basic
Necessities Survey score, and (b) rice harvests of
households with >1 ha of paddy. The graphs show the
predicted effects and 95% confidence intervals from
the mixed effects model (within protected area [PA]
n = 443 households; control areas n = 185
households).
effect of the PAs; the 2 conservation strategies are
complementary.
As a consequence of the exclusion of outsiders from
the PAs, local people have been able to continue to use
forest and land resources for their livelihoods based upon
their legal rights under Cambodian law, including use
of forest resources (especially resin) and farming within
agreed land-use plans. No resettlement occurred. The
Cambodian PAs are therefore very different from strictly
enforced PAs, but they share many characteristics with
the estimated 56–85% of PAs in developing countries
that contain local people (Brockington & Igoe 2006).
Our principal finding was that under these conditions PA
management had minimal impacts on the livelihoods of
local residents on average, which is consistent with the
PAs being primarily designed to protect ecosystems from
external drivers of loss. Instead, the improvements in
well-being seen across all treatment groups were driven
largely by Cambodia’s rapid economic growth. PA man-
agement restricted livelihood opportunities for local peo-
ple by limiting crop types (principally shifting cultivation
and cash crops) and some land clearance. Conversely,
PAs provided notable benefits for forest resource users
(such as resin tappers), who gained from the restrictions
on outsiders (Clements et al. 2014). Continued and unsus-
tainable use of natural resources in PAs by local residents
can, however, lead to trade-offs from a biodiversity con-
servation perspective, as such PAs may be less effective
at conserving key species (O’Kelly et al. 2012).
Ours is one of the first studies to evaluate the social
impacts of PES programs. Our results provide empirical
support for suggestions that the impacts of PES on human
well-being depend fundamentally upon program design
(Pagiola et al. 2005; Wunder 2008). PES can support so-
cial goals by minimizing constraints on program entry
by the poor and providing sufficient incentives to off-
set the opportunity costs of participation and thereby
increasing overall human well-being. The PES program
Conservation Biology
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entry constraints might include eligibility requirements
or abilities, which the poor would be less likely to fulfill
(Wunder 2008). Of the 3 PES programs we evaluated,
the Ibis Rice program had the most significant entry con-
straints; participants needed to have sufficient land to
produce an agricultural surplus to sell to the program. By
contrast, the Bird Nests program, which provided direct
cash payments for protection of biodiversity, required
no capital assets to join and provided a portion of the
payment up-front, allowing any household to participate.
The pro-poor impacts of ecotourism are known to be
limited by the additional capabilities required to engage
in tourism (Kiss 2004). The Cambodian ecotourism pro-
gram specifically contained pro-poor provisions, which
mitigated these barriers to some extent.
There was no evidence that any of the PES programs
led to net negative impacts on local well-being, and the
2 market-based programs (Ibis Rice and the Ecotourism)
had significant net positive impacts for their participants.
The development benefits of the 3 programs are linked
to the magnitude of the payments made. Under the Bird
Nests program, payments were low, based upon themini-
mum daily wage local people were willing to accept (the
opportunity cost of a day’s work). Despite the lack of
constraints on access, suggesting it should be the most
pro-poor of the interventions, the additional livelihood
benefit of the program was limited. By contrast, payment
levels under the 2 market-based programs were based on
the market’s willingness to pay for the additional envi-
ronmental outcomes, which was high.
The robustness of these results depends upon the ex-
tent to which the survey design adequately addressed
potential sources of bias. The deforestation results were
based on a full BACI survey and hence are likely to be
the most robust. The key assumption was that protected
forest areas were similar to unprotected forest control
areas, which is likely given that the placement of PAs
was based primarily upon remoteness, rather than dif-
ferences in productivity, and because the landscape is
relatively uniform and there were suitable large, remote,
forested areas that remained unprotected. The interven-
tion and control areas for both the PA and PES analyses
had similar deforestation rates prior to the initiation of
the conservation programs in 2005, which supports this
assumption.
The assessment of the social impact of PAs was based
on the matching of the within-PA and control villages
and assumed that households within the 2 groups prac-
ticed similar livelihood strategies when PA management
started in 2005 and that the observed subsequent diver-
gence in poverty status and livelihood strategies was due
to the interventions rather than other factors. These as-
sumptions are reasonable because 2008 livelihood assess-
ments suggested that the within-PA and control villages
were very similar and differed little from other remote
forest villages in the same landscape in the mid-2000s
(McKenney et al. 2004). Over the study period other
factors that would affect poverty (such as development
interventions) tended to be implemented relatively uni-
formly over the province. The analysis of subgroup ef-
fects, for resin tappers and landowners, was based upon
an a priori hypothesis that these groups are affected
by development pressures outside PAs (Clements et al.
2014). We assumed that membership of these groups,
with respect to the interventions, was random, which is
reasonable given that a large number of people across the
landscape practice these livelihood strategies. The PES
social impact assessment was based only on a difference-
in-differences estimator and assumed that the trend of
payment and non-payment households would have been
similar in the absence of the payments and that selection
was not contingent upon time-lagged variables. This is
reasonable given that both groups of households were
selected from the same villages and the major factors
affecting poverty status (market access, agricultural pro-
ductivity, development projects) would exert their influ-
ence across the entire village.
The combination of the PA and PES interventions
described here delivered additional environmental out-
comes, relative to the counterfactual, and had 3 impor-
tant social impacts: securing forest resources for local
residents, which benefited some groups whilst imposing
costs on others; providing new significant sources of cash
income for households that could afford to engage in the
PES programs; and delivering net positive impacts for at
least some of the PES participants. Our results confirm
that PES, when designed appropriately, can be a power-
ful new tool for delivering conservation outcomes whilst
benefiting local people, particularly as a complement to
more traditional conservation interventions such as PAs.
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